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Background 
 This briefing is drawn from: 
David McNicol, David Tate, Sarah Burns, and Linda Wu, “Further Evidence 
on the Effect of Acquisition Regime on Cost Growth,” IDA Paper P-5330 
(Draft Final), April 2016. 
 That paper extends results presented in: 
David McNicol and Linda Wu, “Evidence on the Effect of DoD Acquisition 
Policy and Process and Funding Climate on Cost Growth of Major Defense 
Acquisitions Programs,”  IDA Paper P-5126, September 2014. 
 These results were presented at last year’s NPS Acquisition 
Research Symposium. 
 Both papers were sponsored by the Director, Performance 
Assessments and Root Cause Analyses. 
 The project attempts a quantitative assessment of the effects of 
changes in acquisition policy and process on MDAP outcomes. 
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   1st Observation: 
(a) The Packard reforms of 1969 significantly reduced average APUC 
growth. (b) Additional reforms over about the next 25 years did not 
further reduce APUC growth. (c) During the AR years, APUC growth 




Defense Systems Acquisition 
Review Council (DSARC)   
Post Carlucci Initiatives DSARC 
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
Acquisition Reform (AR) 




1964–1969 85% (20) 
1970–1980 39% (53) 
1987–1989 44% (12) 
1990–1993 32% (11) 
1994–2000 78% (27) 




* Normalized for changes in quantity. 
   2nd Observation: 
(a) MDAPs that passed MS II/B during McNamara-Clifford and during AR 
had significantly higher proportions of programs that experienced 
extremely high APUC growth.*  (b) The proportions across acquisition 








Acquisition Regime  Average APUC Growth** ≥ 50% ≥ 100% ≥ X̅ + S 
McNamara-Clifford 1964–1969 85% (20) 10 6 4 
DSARC 1970–1980 39% (53) 19 7 0 
Post-Carlucci DSARC 1987–1989 44% (12) 4 3 1 
DAB 1990–1993 32% (11) 5 1 0 
Acquisition Reform  1994–2000 78% (27) 11 7 7 
DAB post-AR 2001–2002 113% (6) 2 1 1 
*  Extremely high APUC  growth: at  least one standard deviation (S) above the sample mean (X̅) for bust 
periods. X̅ + S = 143%. 





Post Carlucci Initiatives DSARC 
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
Acquisition Reform (AR) 











There is no statistical significant association between 
acquisition regime and average APUC growth in bust funding 
climates when extremely high cost growth observations* are 
excluded. 
*   APUC growth greater than ≥ X̅ + S = 143%.  
** Normalized for changes in quantity. 
Cautions 
 The crucial statistically visible effects of acquisition regimes are on 
the relative frequency of extremely high cost growth programs (2nd   
Observation). 
 
 Apart from the effects on extremely high cost growth programs, 
there is not a statistically significant association between changes in 
acquisition regime and average APUC growth of programs that 
passed MS II/B during the regime. (3rd Observation) 
 
 This does not imply that OSD-level oversight of MDAPs has no 
effect. It does imply, however, that changes in OSD-level acquisition 
policy and process relative to McNamara-Clifford did not make 
APUC growth either better or worse for MDAPs that passed MS II/B 
during bust funding periods. 
5 
Some Opinions Suggested by the Observations 
 It seems unlikely that further changes in acquisition policy or process 
will have a major effect on cost growth. 
 
 The relevant context for understanding APUC growth is the interface 
between the acquisition process and the program/budget process. 
 
 The root causes of cost growth arguably lie in a mismatch among 
mission and functions, force structure, and function.  
 When something must give, something does give. 
 Extremely optimistic programmatic or cost assumptions may appear to be 
the least bad option. 
 
 The underlying cause of persistent high APUC growth is not a deeply 





 The Effect of Post MS II/B Funding Climate on Cost Growth.  
 
 Further Evidence on the Effect of Acquisition Regime and Funding 
Climate on RDT&E Growth (parallel to P-5330’s analysis of APUC 
growth). 
 
 Further Evidence on the Effect of Acquisition Regime and Funding 
Climate on Truncations and Cancellations (IDA P-5218) 
 
 IDA publication that consolidates this work and P-5126, P-5218, and    
P-5330.  
Backup 
The Outcome Metric—Growth in Average 
Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) 
 The research used APUC growth for 190 Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs) that passed MS II/B during FY 1970–FY 2007.  
 
 Each of these MDAPs went into production. 
 There are no cancelled programs in the sample. 
 
 APUC growth is measured from the MS II/B baseline and 
normalized to the MS II/B total quantity acquired. 
 
 APUC growth over the entire acquisition cycle is associated with the 
Fiscal Year in which the MDAP passed MS II/B; for example: 
 
 APUC growth for the F-22 over FY 1991–FY 2006 is assigned to FY 
1991, the year in which the F-22 passed MS II. 
 The average APUC growth for FY 1987–FY 1993 is the average 
quantity normalized PAUC growth of all MDAPs that passed MS II 
during those years. 
9 
Budget Authority Appropriated for Procurement, 
 1960–1982* 
* In Billions of Constant FY 2015 Dollars. 
Source: “National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2014,” Office of the Under  












1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1st Bust-Boom Cycle 2nd Bust-Boom Cycle 
Selection of Break Points between Funding Climates 
 This research used only two funding climate categories—Relatively 
Constrained and Relatively Accommodating. 
 Our touchstone in selection of break points was major shifts in the 
expectation about future funding of senior DoD decision makers. 
 We used three events to identify the break points between funding climates: 
 The invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR in late December 1979; 
 The passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act in December 1985; and 
 The terrorist attack on the U.S. on Sept. 11, 2001. 
 Senior decision makers could reasonably expect each of these events to 
result in major and sustained changes in the defense funding climate. 
 After examining contemporary policy statements and events, we selected: 
 FY 1981 as the first year of the Carter-Reagan buildup; 
 FY 1986 as the final year of the Carter-Reagan buildup; and 
 FY 2003 as the first year of the post-9/11 defense buildup. 
11 
Are there Other Factors that Must Be Considered? 
 
 The statistical examinations consider only two factors bearing on 
MDAP outcomes—acquisition regime and funding climate. 
 The results are not compromised by the omission of factors that are 
uncorrelated with either acquisition regime or funding climate—e.g., 
a tendency towards increased complexity in MDAPs over time. 
 The results for these two factors would be compromised by 
omission of factors important to cost growth that are also correlated 
with acquisition regime or funding climate. 
12 
The results sought are not directly about the causes of cost growth, 
but, rather, when and where cost growth occurs: 
 When, in terms of chronology and of the point in the acquisition cycle 
at which the main seeds of cost growth are sown; and 




McNamara-Clifford Operated only in a bust funding climate 
Defense Systems 
Acquisition Review 
Council (DSARC)   
1970–1980 N = 53 1981–1982 N = 9 
Post Carlucci Initiatives 
DSARC 1987–1989 N = 12 1983–1986 N = 34 
Defense Acquisition 
Board (DAB) Operated only in a bust funding climate 
Acquisition Reform (AR) Operated only in a bust funding climate 
DAB post AR 2001–2002   N = 6 2003–2007 N = 17 
Three acquisition regimes operated in both funding climates. 
These provide a way to gauge the effect of funding climate, 
given acquisition regime. 




25 MDAPs that 
were Cancelled 
151 MDAPs that 




≥ 50% 40% (10) 26% (40) 20% (10 of 50) 
≥ 30% but <30% 0 (0) 11% (17) 0 (0 of 17) 
0 to 30% 40% (10) 46% (64) 14% (10 of 74) 
<0 20% (5) 19% (30) 15% (5 of 35) 
Total 100% (25) 100% (151) 14% (25 of 176) 
14 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the probability that an MDAP 
will be cancelled is not strongly dependent on the  level of cost 
growth it experiences. 














DAB post AR 
not observed 
1981–1982 N = 9 
1983–1986 N = 34 
no observations 
no observations 
2003–2007 N = 17 
1964–1969 N = 20 
1970–1980 N = 53 
1987–1989 N = 12 
1990–1993 N = 11 
1994–2000 N = 27 
2001–2002 N = 6 
Each funding climate is analyzed separately. All six acquisition regimes operated during 
periods of bust funding; only three of the regimes operated during boom periods. We looked 
at both average APUC growth and the proportion of MDAPs with extremely high APUC 
growth. 














DSARC 1970–1982 0.5/yr. 
Post-Carlucci 
DSARC 1986–1989 2.3/yr. 1983–1985 0.3/yr. 
DAB 1990–1993 3.3/yr. 
AR 1994–2000 0.4/yr. 
DAB post AR 2009–2012 2.8/yr. 2001–2008 1.3/yr. 
Annual average cancellation rates are much higher when procurement funding 
is sharply decreasing than when it is stable or increasing. 
Average Cancellation Rates for Cohorts, by Acquisition 








DSARC 1970–1980 14% (10/74) 1981–1982 24% (4/17) 
Post-Carlucci 
DSARC 1987–1989 42% (11/26) 1983–1986 12% (6/51) 
DAB 1990–1993 7% (1/15) 
AR 1994–2000 14% (6/43) 
DAB post AR 2001–2002 27% (4/15) 2003–2007 30% (11/37) 
Note: Number of cancellations and cohort size in parentheses. 
The high cancellation rate of the 1987–1989 cohort probably reflects a 
situation unique to the 2nd Reagan Administration. The DAB post AR also had 
a comparatively high cancellation rate for both funding climates. Otherwise, 
there does not seem to be an association between cohort cancellation rates, 
acquisition regime, and funding climate. 
Bias in the MS II/B PAUC Estimate and the Frequency of 









Growth Relatively Constrained 
Funding Climate 
